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Some Implications of Arrow's Theorem
for Voting Rights
Grant M. Hayden*
Arrow's theorem proves that no voting procedure can meet certain condi-
tions of both fairness and logic. In this note, Grant Hayden explores the
ramifications of the theorem for qualitative vote dilution. After describing Ar-
row's argument, Mr. Hayden considers four democratic voting procedures-
the Condorcet method, the amendment procedure, the Borda count, and cumu-
lative voting-in the light of the theorem. He then explores some of the theo-
retical and practical implications of the theorem. In the remainder of the note,
Mr. Hayden discusses how well section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
its judicial interpretation in Thornburg v. Gingles accord with the dictates of
Arrow's theorem, ultimately concluding that the courts should consider the
first two in the light of the theorem.
INTRODUCTION
Almost fifty years ago, Justice Frankfurter warned that legislative appor-
tionment was a "political thicket" courts should not attempt to penetrate.1 The
Supreme Court, however, ignored Justice Frankfurter's admonition and
plunged headlong into that thicket in Baker v. Carr,2 a 1962 decision opening
the door to challenging state voting procedures on constitutional grounds.
While courts easily dispatched the problem of quantitative vote dilution with
the now classic formulation "one person, one vote, ' 3 the complexities of quali-
tative vote dilution4 have proven more intractable. As a result, courts continue
to struggle to develop satisfactory standards for measuring and remedying qual-
itative vote dilution.
As courts search for acceptable standards, their progress may be impeded
by a theoretical barrier first described by Kenneth Arrow in 1951.5 Arrow's
* Third-year law student, Stanford Law School. I am most grateful to Stephen Ellis for his
thoughts on this subject, and to the Blue Goose of El Dorado, Kansas, for providing a suitable atmos-
phere for discussion. I am also indebted to Barbara Phillips and Professor Bernard Grofman for com-
ments on earlier drafts, and to my mother, Julie Hayden, and Joanna Grossman for their support.
Thanks as well to the editors of the Stanford Law Review.
1. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,556 (1946), quoted in Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political
Thicket, 41 FLA. L. R-v. 563, 563 (1989).
2. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that appellants' challenge to a Tennessee apportionment
scheme was justiciable and presented no political question).
3. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (finding unconstitutional a Georgia law whose effect
was to make each vote count less as the population of a county increased).
4. Qualitative vote dilution occurs when voters' preferences are not accurately expressed in the
outcome of an election, despite the fact that society weighs each individual's vote equally.
5. KENzm I. ARRow, SociAL CHoicE Am INDrvouAL VALEs 93-96 (2d ed. 1963).
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theorem holds that no voting procedure can be both fair and logical.6 This note
examines the theorem and discusses its implications for qualitative vote dilu-
tion. Part I describes Arrow's theorem and its five conditions of fairness and
logicality. Consideration of four democratic voting procedures and their viola-
tion of at least one of the theorem's conditions illustrates the power of Arrow's
observation. Part II explores the theoretical and practical implications of the
theorem. Finally, Part HI discusses how well section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 19657 and its judicial interpretation accord with the dictates of Arrow's
theorem.
Some definitions are essential for the reader unfamiliar with social choice
theory.8 An individual preference order is a complete arrangement of a set of
alternatives in order of their desirability to an individual.9 The relationship
between any two alternatives is either one of preference (P) or indifference (I).
Thus, if Chris's preference order is xPyPzlw, then Chris prefers x to y, prefers y
to z, and is indifferent between z and w.10 A preference profile is a set of
individual preference orders, one for each individual." By contrast, a social
preference order is a complete arrangement of alternatives in order of their
attractiveness to society as a whole. 12 Finally, a social choice function trans-
lates a series of individual preference profiles into a social preference order.
13
The ideal social choice function successfully aggregates individual prefer-
ence orders into social preference orders, translating individual desires into
group choices. 14 Historically, democratic institutions have adopted voting pro-
cedures to handle this task.' 5 Unfortunately, however, the adequacy of all so-
cial choice functions was called into question with the publication of Arrow's
theorem.
6. See NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMR, MODERN POLITrcAL ECONOMY 19-23 (1978)
(summarizing Arrow's assumptions, conditions, and conclusions). See text accompanying notes 16-32
infra for a detailed description of the theorem.
7. 42 U.S.C. §, 1973 (1988).
8. The terminology in this note is largely derived from the work of William Riker. See VnLIubi
H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AoAsrsr POPULISM: A CONFRONTAT1ON BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 293-98 (1982) (providing a glossary of terms).
9. Id. at 296.
10. All examples in this note involve individuals who prefer one alternative to another, no individ-
ual will be indifferent.
11. RIKER, supra note 8, at 296.
12. See PETER C. ORDsHooc GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 55
(1986) (warning that institutions cannot be understood "as black boxes into which we plug preferences
and out of which emerge... 'social preference' "); RI ER, supra note 8, at 18 (providing an example of
"social preference").
13. RIKER, supra note 8, at 297.
14. "Mhe theory of social choice is a theory about the way the tastes, preferences, or values of
individual persons are amalgamated and summarized into the choice of a collective group or society:'
Id. at 1.
15. See FRoILICH & OPPEmrErmER, supra note 6, at 16-17 (using the example of public prefer-
ences over American policy in Vietnam to illustrate the difficulty of using voting procedures to find a
rational group choice).
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I. ARRow's THEOREM
Arrow's theorem demonstrates that no social choice function can simulta-
neously satisfy certain minimal conditions of fairness and logicality.' 6 The the-
orem stipulates four fairness conditions-nondictatorship, Pareto efficiency,
universal admissibility, and independence from irrelevant alternatives-and
one logical condition-transitivity.' 7 Its proscription arises whenever two or
more individuals choose among three or more alternatives.' 8
A. The Conditions
1. Nondictatorship.
The condition of nondictatorship ensures that no single person's prefer-
ences dictate the social preference order.19 More specifically, to satisfy the
nondictatorship condition there can be no personj such thatj's individual pref-
erence order xPjy determines the social preference order xPy regardless of what
other members of society prefer.20 This condition echoes the democratic intui-
tion that one person's preferences should not dictate policy. If a social choice
function violated the condition of nondictatorship, then voting would be point-
less: Society could just poll the dictator and implement her preferences.
2. Pareto efficiency.
Pareto efficiency stipulates that if everyone prefers alternative x to alterna-
tive y, then the outcome of the social choice function must also prefer x to y.2 1
This condition's justification is readily discernible. Democratic elections are
intended to settle issues by responding to individual voter preferences. If indi-
vidual preferences have any meaningful relation to outcomes, then a social
choice function that chooses one alternative over another, universally preferred
option is perverse. In other words, if every individual agrees that x is better
than y, a democratic vote should never result in outcome y. Thus, like
nondictatorship, the condition of Pareto efficiency rests upon firm democratic
intuitions. 22
16. ARRow, supra note 5, at 51-59. For a more concise version of the proof, see ORDESHooK,
supra note 12, at 62-64.
17. See ARROW, supra note 5, at 22-31 (establishing his conditions). Riker describes six fairness
conditions. RiKER, supra note 8, at 116-19. However, his additional criteria-monotonicity and citi-
zens' sovereignty-are variations of the other four. Subsuming these additional conditions into the
primary four simplifies the analysis. For a discussion of these additional concepts as independent condi-
tions, see id. at 117.
18. See ARRow, supra note 5, at 48-51 (proving that the assumption that a single social welfare
function could meet Arrow's conditions creates a contradiction). With only two alternatives, a simple
majority vote satisfies all of the conditions of fairness and logicality. See id. at 48 (observing that this
fact "is, in a sense, the logical foundation of the Anglo-American two-party system"). Unfortunately,
the real world is never so simple, and society instead relies upon voting devices such as primaries to
artificially narrow a voter's range of choices.
19. RiKER, supra note 8, at 295.
20. Id at 118.
21. Id at 117.
22. See id. at 118 (describing Pareto optimality as "the carrier of monotonicity and nonimposition,




The condition of universal admissibility demands that a social choice func-
tion be able to describe a social preference relation for any possible preference
profile.23 Thus, to comply with this condition, a voting procedure must work
with all possible permutations of voter preferences over a set of alternatives.
For example, given alternatives x, y, and z, universal admissibility demands that
a social choice function operate with the preference profiles of any combination
of voters with any of the following preference orders:24
1. x y z 3. y x z 5. z x y
2. x z y 4. y z x 6. z y x
The alternative to this condition, restricting individual preference orders, runs
counter to democratic principles: People should not be ineligible to vote
because of their opinions. 5 Thus, basic notions of democratic fairness demand
that social choice procedures operate with any preference profile.
4. Independence from irrelevant alternatives.
Arrow's fourth fairness condition, independence from irrelevant alterna-
tives, requires that the presence of an irrelevant alternative, z, in a social prefer-
ence profile does not affect the order of x and y in that profile.26 The term
"irrelevant" is not pejorative; it simply refers to an alternative outside the set
from which a group must choose.
The intuition behind this condition is less apparent than with the first three
fairness conditions. The following example illustrates the irrationality of al-
lowing irrelevant alternatives to influence preference orders. A waiter offers
Joanna a choice between two flavors of frozen yogurt: vanilla and chocolate.
Joanna orders vanilla. The waiter takes her order, but quickly returns to inform
her that strawberry frozen yogurt is also available.
Joanna responds, "Well, in that case, I'd like chocolate." Joanna's response
seems irrational because the existence of strawberry frozen yogurt should not
influence her preference for vanilla over chocolate. Strawberry, in other words,
is an irrelevant alternative.27
Independence from irrelevant alternatives not only ensures rational social
preferences, but also prevents manipulation of the social preference order. If
23. Id. at 116, 297.
24. As stated in note 10 supra, none of the examples in this note considers indifference.
25. RiKaa, supra note 8, at 117. Riker argues that "[a]ny rule or command that prohibits a person
from choosing some preference order is morally unacceptable (or at least unfair) from the point of view
of democracy." Id.
26. ARRow, supra note 5, at 26; IKER, supra note 8, at 118.
27. There are several possible objections to this example. First, Joanna may believe that placing
strawberry and vanilla frozen yogurt in the same freezer causes the vanilla to taste awful. But in that
case, strawberry is a relevant, not an irrelevant, alternative: Its presence alters the qualitative character-
istics of the original choices. Second, Joanna may have changed her mind in the time it took the waiter
to return to the table. But this objection merely reflects a flaw in the example. A change in preferences
over a period of time does not trigger violations of the condition of independence from irrelevant alter-
natives on a societal level; only the addition of the irrelevant alternative violates the condition.
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the outcome of an election between two alternatives can be altered merely by
the introduction or removal of a third alternative, the election is vulnerable to
manipulation to achieve a specific result. Thus, the condition of independence
from irrelevant alternatives imposes a reasonable requirement upon democratic
social choice functions.
5. Transitivity.
Finally, Arrow's logical condition of transitivity guarantees that a social
choice function will produce a complete and transitive social preference or-
der.2 8 A transitive arrangement of preferences guarantees that if x is preferred
to y, and y to z, then x will be preferred to z.29 Like independence from irrele-
vant alternatives, transitivity ensures that social preference orders display some
sort of collective rationality.30 If one prefers beef to chicken, and chicken to
fish, it would be inexplicable that he also prefers fish to beef.
Yet perhaps transitive preference orders only serve as a proper condition of
rationality for individuals, not groups. For aggregation of individual preference
orders that are each transitive may still result in an intransitive social preference
order.31 Although an intransitive individual preference order such as xPyPzPx
signals irrationality, a social preference order of the same form may be an ac-
ceptable outcome of a social choice procedure.
Intransitive social preference orders, however, suffer from a major problem:
their inability to declare a "winner." For example, the social preference order
xPyPzPx fails to designate a clear social choice; each alternative appears to
stake an equal claim. In addition, intransitive social orders permit manipulation
of social choice through agenda control. Since any alternative in an intransitive
social order can prevail if put to a vote at the appropriate moment, control of
the voting agenda becomes "tantamount to dictatorial power.'' 32 For these rea-
sons, the condition of transitivity is essential to ensuring that social choice
functions produce meaningful outcomes.
B. How Several Popular Social Choice Functions Violate Arrow's
Conditions
If Arrow is correct, no social choice function will satisfy all five conditions
of democratic fairness and logicality. This result may constrain legal attempts
to structure "fair" voting procedures. The following survey of four social
choice procedures illustrates the inevitability of Arrow's conflict.
28. R KER, supra note 8, at 119.
29. Id at 297.
30. See id. at 119 (describing the failure to produce social transitivity as "a kind of social irration-
ality"). According to Riker, Arrow himself described social transitivity as collective rationality. Id.
31. See FRoHurcH & OPPENHmImE, supra note 6, at 27.
32. lt For example, the cycle xPyPzPx can be manipulated to produce three different outcomes:
running x against y, with the winner to face z. results in the social choice z; running y against z. with the
winner to face x, results in the social choice x; and running x against z. with the winner to face y, results
in the social choice y.
January 1995]
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1. The Condorcet method.
The Condorcet method is an adaptation of the more familiar majority deci-
sion procedure that allows it to be applied to more than two alternatives.3 3 The
method places each alternative through a series of simple majority, binary elec-
tions with each of the other alternatives.34 The alternative that defeats each of
the other alternatives in every binary comparison is the Condorcet winner.35
The Condorcet method, therefore, guarantees that if voters prefer one alterna-
tive to each of the other alternatives by a simple majority then that alternative
becomes the social choice.
If no alternative can defeat each of the others, however, the Condorcet win-
ner remains undefined.3 6 Consider the following profile of three voters ranking
three alternatives:37
P,
V, x y z
V2  y z x
V3  z x y
Given this preference profile, the Condorcet method produces the following
result:
Votes for the option in the
row when in contest with
the option in the column:
x y z
x 2 1
y 1 - 2
z 2 1
With three voters, an alternative would have to receive at least two votes to
defeat another alternative; an alternative must receive at least two votes against
all other alternatives to be declared the Condorcet winner. In this example, no
single alternative defeats each of the others in a simple majority, binary
election. Instead, the Condorcet method produces the voting cycle xPyPzPx,
and the winner remains undefined.38
Profile P1 illustrates Arrow's theorem by demonstrating the Condorcet
method's inability to generate a social preference order without violating one of
Arrow's five conditions. Preference profiles such as P produce intransitive
outcomes, violating Arrow's fifth condition. Individual preference orders that
give rise to preference profiles like P must be prohibited to ensure a transitive
social preference order. Such a prohibition, however, clearly violates the
33. RiKER, supra note 8, at 67.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Il at 67-69.
37. This example is based on Riker's explanation of the Condorcet method and the paradox of
voting. Id. at 68 display 4-1.
38. Id.
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condition of universal admissibility. Thus, for the Condorcet method to work,
either universal admissibility or transitivity must be abandoned.
2. The amendment procedure.
The amendment procedure, sometimes called parliamentary voting, is a
Condorcet extension39 designed to select the Condorcet winner, or, if the Con-
dorcet winner is undefined as in P1, select the status quo. The amendment
procedure presents voters with several alternatives, typically in the form of mo-
tions, amendments, or amendments to amendments, in a series of simple major-
ity, binary elections. The winner of the first election competes against the next
alternative in a specified order until only one remains. That final alternative
then competes against the status quo in a simple majority election. 40
The amendment procedure, however, may violate the condition of Pareto
efficiency. Given some preference profiles, the procedure may select a winner
that voters unanimously view as inferior to another alternative.41 Consider the
following profile, composed of the preference orders of three voters over five
alternatives:
P2
V, w x z y s
V2  y w x z s
V3  s x z y w
Votes for the option in the row when in
contest with the option in the column:
x y z w s
x - 2 3 1 2
y 1 1 2 2
z 0 2 - 1 2
w 2 1 2 2
s 1 1 1 1 -
The only binary election that produces a unanimous winner pairs x against z,
with x receiving all three votes. Nonetheless, z may emerge victorious under
the amendment procedure. Consider the following example:
Step 1: x vs. w; w wins
Step 2: w vs. y; y wins
Step 3: y vs. z; z wins
Step 4: z vs. s; z wins
Alternative z emerges as the social choice even though every voter prefers x to
z. This result clearly violates the condition of Pareto efficiency. To preserve
Pareto efficiency would require prohibiting individual preference orders that
39. The following description of the amendment procedure derives its definitions and examples
from Riker's work. Id. at 69-73.
40. Id. at 70.
41. Id. at 71-73.
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dictate preference profiles such as P2. But such a prohibition would, once
again, violate the condition of universal admissibility.
3. The Borda count.
The Borda count is a positional social choice function. Instead of merely
evaluating binary relations between alternatives, positional methods consider
the ranking of each alternative in an individual preference order. Thus, posi-
tional methods such as the Borda count simultaneously consider the ordinal
relationships among all of the alternatives, whereas majoritarian methods focus
on the ability of one alternative to prevail over another in a binary contest.42
The Borda count assigns a numerical score to every alternative in each
voter's preference order. In an election with n alternatives, each voter gives
n-1 points to her first choice, n-2 points to her second choice, and continues
this process through her last choice, which receives n-n, or zero, points. Each
alternative's scores are summed, and the alternative with the most points be-
comes the Borda winner.43
Given certain preference profiles, however, the Borda count violates the
condition of independence from irrelevant alternatives. Consider profile P3, re-
flecting the preference orders of two voters over three alternatives:
P3
VI x y z
V2  z x y
The Borda count applies to profile P3 as follows:
x y z
V, 2 1 0
V2  1 0 2
3 1 2
Since x receives the most points, it is the Borda winner. The social preference
order is xPzPy.
The Borda count, however, leaves P3 vulnerable to manipulation by the
introduction or removal of irrelevant alternatives."4 Given preference profile
P3, the Borda count ranked x ahead of z. Yet moving y's position within the
preference profile can cause x and z to reverse rankings in the outcome despite
the fact that they maintain the same positions relative to each other. Profile P4
reflects such a change in the position of alternative y:
42. Id. at 81.
43. Id. at 81-82.
44. For an explanation of the irrelevant alternatives criterion, see text accompanying notes 26-27
supra. The following discussion draws on Riker's discussion of the Borda count's violation of the
independence from irrelevant alternatives criterion. RiKER, supra note 8, at 105, 108 display 4-19.
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P4
V, x z y
V2  z y x
The results of applying the Borda count to profile P4 are:
x y z
V, 2 0 1
V2  0 1 2
2 1 3
Every voter has x and z in the same order in profiles P3 and P4; the only
difference is the positional change of irrelevant alternative y. But the outcome
has changed: Given profile P4, the Borda count selects z instead of x,
producing the social preference order zPxPy. By selecting x when given P3 and
z when given P4, the Borda procedure violates the condition of independence
from irrelevant alternatives by allowing y to influence the outcome between x
and z. Like the Condorcet method and the amendment procedure, the Borda
count can only ensure independence from irrelevant alternatives by prohibiting
certain individual preference orders, thereby violating the condition of
universal admissibility.
4. Cumulative voting.
Cumulative voting, like the Borda count, is a positional social choice proce-
dure.45 In a cumulative voting scheme, each person is allotted as many votes as
there are open seats.46 Voters may distribute their votes as they see fit, either
aggregating their votes for one strongly preferred alternative or dispersing their
votes among several alternatives. 47 The alternatives receiving the most votes
win.48
Cumulative voting, like most positional social choice functions, violates the
condition of independence from irrelevant alternatives.49 Consider the follow-
ing preference profile, P5, in which each of four voters distributes two votes
among three alternatives:
45. Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Dis-
tricts, 14 CARDozo L. Rnv. 1135, 1156 (1993) (arguing that cumulative voting and other "semipropor-
tional election systems may provide a more politically fair route to participation and political
representation for racially distinct groups"). Guinier, a leading proponent of cumulative voting, advo-
cates a proportional power approach to elections within multimember districts as a possible remedy for
vote dilution cases and as a tool to revitalize electoral politics. Id. at 1169-70.
46. IM. at 1169.
47. ld. at 1136.
48. Under cumulative voting, a minority comprising 30% of the population could not be prevented
from electing a representative of its choice to one of three open seats, provided that members of the
minority group voted as a politically cohesive bloc and aggregated their votes. Id.
49. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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P5(vote distributions in parentheses)
V, x(2) y(O) z(O)
V2  y(2) z(0) x(0)
V3  y(1) z(1) x(O)
V4  x(1) z(1) y(O)
Cumulative voting produces the following outcome:
x y z
V, 2 0 0
V2  0 2 0
V3  0 1 1
V4  1 0 1
3 3 2
Since x and y receive the most votes, they are the cumulative vote winners.
Like the Borda count, however, the addition of irrelevant alternatives
subjects cumulative voting to manipulation. The introduction of irrelevant
alternative w, for example, dramatically changes the results. Consider the
following profile.
P6(vote distributions in parentheses)
V, w(2) x(O) y(O) z(0)
V2  w(2) y(O) z(0) x(0)
V3  y(1) z(1) x(0) w(0)
V4  x(1) z(1) y(O) w(O)
Cumulative voting produces the following results:
x y z w
V, 0 0 0 2
V2  0 0 0 2
V3  0 1 1 0
V4  1 0 1 0
1 1 2 4
With the mere addition of irrelevant alternative w, z now beats both of the
previous winners, violating the condition of independence from irrelevant
alternatives. Once again, the only way to ensure that condition is met is to
prohibit certain individual preference orders, violating the condition of
universal admissibility.
If. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARROW'S THEOREM
A. Theoretical Implications
Arrow's theorem has profound implications for democratic theory. As the
previous analyses of the Condorcet method, amendment procedure, Borda
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count, and cumulative voting suggest, no social choice function generates a
result consistent with all of Arrow's five conditions. So long as society pre-
serves democratic institutions embodying the four fairness conditions, those
institutions will produce intransitive social preference orders.50 As a result,
some social choices will be unordered and thus meaningless. 51 Given that fact,
references to "the will of the people" or "the public interest" become suspect
because intransitive social preference orders cannot consistently define coher-
ent collective preferences.52 On initial investigation, then, Arrow's theorem
casts doubt upon the usefulness of any social choice procedure and makes the
future of democratic theory look bleak indeed.53
Proponents of democracy's integrity may raise objections to this dismal
forecast. First, perhaps Arrow was wrong. This is unlikely: He sets up only
minimal conditions of fairness and logicality, and the proof itself appears invul-
nerable.54 Second, even if Arrow's theorem is formally correct, perhaps theo-
rists overstate its negative implications for the future of democratic theory. 55
After all, Arrow's theorem merely proves that no social choice function pro-
duces a rational social preference order for every preference profile. If certain
social choice functions lead to rational outcomes most, or even some, of the
time, then there may be less cause for alarm.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the rationality or irrationality of
a given social preference order. No secret method of amalgamating individual
preferences enables society to determine the "true" social choice. Any standard
for evaluating social choices remains vulnerable to the same violations of Ar-
row's five conditions it is designed to test. Thus, although some social prefer-
ence orders are both fair and rational, society is incapable of confirming their
validity.
Although we cannot verify the reasonableness of any given social outcome,
our fear of deceptive outcomes may be minimized by understanding that intran-
sitivities occur infrequently. The next Part addresses this possibility.
50. rKca, supra note 8, at 136.
51. See ia. at 119, 136. "This conclusion appears to be devastating, for it consigns democratic
outcomes-and hence the democratic method-to the world of arbitrary nonsense, at least some of the
time." Id. at 119.
52. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 12, at 56-57 (discussing the ramifications of Arrow's impossibil-
ity result in light of the Condorcet paradox).
53. Democratic voting procedures may serve other objectives, such as enhancing governmental
legitimacy. However, such justifications ultimately depend on a rational connection between inputs and
outcomes: Once people realize that there is no such connection, the other objectives are lost.
54. For a brief proof of the theorem, see FRoHLicH & OPPENHEmER, supra note 6, at 23-27. Riker
points out that since "the fairness conditions seem intuitively reasonable-at least to people in Western
culture-.. . most of the attack has been focused on logicality." RurER, supra note 8, at 129. He argues
that Arrow's theorem nonetheless withstands a critique on the basis of the fairness conditions as well as
transitivity. Id. at 129-36.
55. Cf RnmR, supra note 8, at 129 (asking whether the theorem either demands too much or




The theoretical difficulties described by Arrow's theorem are unavoidable.
As illustrated above, democratic decisionmaking procedures inevitably force a
choice between universal admissibility and one of the other conditions of fair-
ness or logicality.56 On a more practical level, however, faith in democratic
choice procedures may not be wholly misplaced. The difficulties attendant to
Arrow's theorem disappear if preference profiles leading to intransitive social
preference orders never occur in the real world. The extent of the practical
impact of Arrow's theorem, then, depends upon how often preference profiles
prone to cycling actually occur.57
Statistically, a substantial proportion of preference profiles result in cycles.
In the set of all possible profiles given three voters and three alternatives, 5.6
percent produce voting cycles.58 As the numbers of voters and alternatives
increase, the incidence of cycling approaches 100 percent.59 It would seem,
therefore, that Arrow's theorem actually describes a significant problem in the
search for meaningful democratic outcomes.
In reality, however, factors beyond the number of voters and alternatives
may help minimize the frequency of cycling. If all voters arrange their alterna-
tives along a common spectrum, cycling will not occur, and a transitive out-
come is guaranteed.60 Consider, for example, an election with three
candidates: a conservative (c), a moderate (m), and a liberal (1). Although
voters may not support the same candidate, they may very well arrange the
candidates along the same political spectrum: c on the right side, I on the left
side, and m in the center. This spectrum agreement would imply that the pref-
erence profile is "value restricted": All voters agree that one candidate, m, is
not the worst.61 Conservative voters would have a preference order of cPmPl,
liberal voters lPmPc, and moderates either mPlPc or mPcPl. In no case is
candidate m the least preferred alternative. Thus with complete spectrum
agreement, no cycling occurs.
Political and sociological conditions suggest that some degree of spectrum
agreement exists in most societies. First, all democracies require a degree of
consensus as a precondition to their formation: Absent some agreement, no
social contract would exist.62 Second, common socialization may shape indi-
56. See texts accompanying notes 38, 41, 44 & 49 supra.
57. The concept of cycling is closely linked to the logical condition of transitivity. Where a social
preference order does not meet the condition of transitivity-in my example, wheje xPyPzPx-that
order is a "cycle." See RiKER, supra note 8, at 294; see also text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
58. RiKER, supra note 8, at 122 display 5-1.
59. hid The numbers increase quite rapidly. For example, with five voters and five alternatives,
20% of the possible preference profiles result in voting cycles. Id.
60. Id. at 123-28. Agreement on the spectrum of alternatives should not be confused with agree-
ment on which alternative is most preferred. The seminal works on the subject of spectrum agreement
are DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY oF ComMrrEES AND ELECrnONS (1963), and DuNcAN BLACK & R.A.
NEwmno, ComMrrTE DEcisioNs wrrH COMPLEmENTARY VALUATION (1951). For a more concise dis-
cussion, see ORD-SHOOK, supra note 12, at 160-65.
61. RiKER, supra note 8, at 128. For the purposes of this example, I assume that a conservative
necessarily prefers a moderate to a liberal and that a liberal prefers a moderate to a conservative.
62. FROELICH & OPPENHEMER, supra note 6, at 19-20.
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vidual perceptions of the spectrum of alternatives, producing the type of value
restriction that prevents cycles. 63
Unfortunately, complete spectrum agreement is never guaranteed. Voters
may choose to support either extreme over a more centrist position. For exam-
ple, voters disappointed in a centrist government may prefer both conservative
and liberal platforms over moderate proposals. Financially strapped farmers
who support substantial farm subsidies may prefer no subsidy over a 30 percent
proposal since a complete lack of support would at least facilitate their decision
to switch occupations.
The likelihood of achieving spectrum agreement decreases when candi-
dates, not discrete issues, comprise the array of alternatives. Since candidates
take positions on many different issues, the participation of single-issue voters
will make spectrum agreement unlikely, as voters exhibit different profiles ac-
cording to their particular issue preference. In practice, then, social choice pro-
cedures will encounter preference profiles containing groups of voters who
disagree on the spectrum of alternatives. Without spectrum agreement, the va-
lidity of social preference orders remains uncertain.
The practical significance of Arrow's theorem, then, is twofold. First, the
enormous theoretical import of the theorem affects the real world of democratic
social choice procedures to the extent that voters fail to agree on the spectrum
of alternatives. This implies that the efficacy of any social choice function
hinges upon the existence of spectrum agreement. Second, the fact that social
preference functions cannot eliminate the possibility of intransitive social pref-
erence orders requires close monitoring of the agenda setting process. Any
alternative within a voting cycle can become the social choice if presented at an
opportune time;64 thus, the individual or group that controls the agenda can
effectively dictate the social choice.
C. Implications for Voting Rights
Beyond its powerful theoretical and practical implications, what lessons
does Arrow's theorem offer students of voting rights? The remainder of this
note explores that question and suggests ways in which the theorem might con-
tribute to the search for judicially manageable standards for measuring vote
dilution.
1. Vote dilution and Arrow's theorem.
Courts first started to struggle with vote dilution after the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.65 Even after the battle to increase minority access
to the voting booth was largely won, devices such as racial gerrymandering and
at-large elections continued to limit minority representation by effectively dilut-
63. See itL at 20.
64. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19 7 3 -19 7 3 p (1988). For a discussion of the 1965 Act's content, later
amendments, and impact on black political participation, see BmuARD GRoFmAN, LSA HANDLEY &
RIcHARD G. NIEA, MINomry REPREsENTAION AD THE QuST FoR VoaiNG EQuALnTY 15-23 (1992).
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ing minorities' voting power.66 Therefore, voting rights advocates turned to
these more invidious forms of discrimination. 67
Although the issue of vote dilution pervades voting rights litigation, neither
courts nor commentators have yet articulated an accepted definition. 68 A help-
ful definition would set up a standard against which to measure dilution. In
order to ascertain when minorities "have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice," 69 one must first determine what the outcome should look
like in the absence of dilution. Thus, the search for a definition of vote dilution
is equivalent to the search for "the ideal against which vote dilution is identi-
fied and measured. '70
For quantitative vote dilution, dividing the total population by the total
number of representatives establishes a district's standard. Comparing the size
of an actual district to the district standard reveals the extent of quantitative
dilution. If a significant deviation comes to light, certain adjustments can rem-
edy the situation.71 This relatively simple process for identifying quantitative
vote dilution contrasts sharply with the more intractable problem of finding and
solving qualitative vote dilution.
Commentators and courts have proposed various standards for measuring
qualitative vote dilution. In the context of minority vote dilution, for example,
one suggested alternative would establish a standard of proportional representa-
tion wherein minorities would constitute the same proportion of members in a
legislative body as they do in the general population.72
Unfortunately, the difficulties Arrow's theorem spells out for social choice
functions also accompany attempts to develop a standard for evaluating those
functions. Deriving a standard requires either an implicit or explicit equating
of preference profiles with ideally matched social preference orders. 73 Yet the
social choice function selected for matching preferences with a social prefer-
ence order remains vulnerable to the theoretical hazards of Arrow's theorem.
Thus, without a method of finding the "correct" social outcome, commentators
66. See Grofman et al., supra note 65, at 24 ("[A]lthough blacks might vote, they would often be
unable to elect candidates of their choice.").
67. See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (enumerating more subtle schemes for reducing minority voter participa-
tion, such as at-large elections, anti-single-shot laws, decreases in the size of legislative bodies, racial
gerrymandering, and exclusive slating).
68. The watershed case for vote dilution challenges is Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan affirmed that a "totality of the circumstances" test applies to
vote dilution and set up three necessary preconditions for such a finding under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. Id. at 50-51, 79. However, he failed to define vote dilution.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
70. Alexander, supra note 1, at 567.
71. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (requiring the apportionment of state
electoral districts by population).
72. Under the Voting Rights Act, evidence of disproportionate representation, while not disposi-
tive, may help substantiate a vote dilution claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). However, the Act explic-
itly states that no one enjoys a right to proportional representation. let
73. A proportional representation standard satisfies this condition since it implies racial bloc vot-
ing or some other common preference grouping. Proportional representation is pointless if voters are
indifferent to being represented by minority representatives.
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and courts cannot even measure qualitative vote dilution, much less remedy it.
Accordingly, attempts to develop standards for measuring vote dilution are the-
oretically doomed from the outset.
Several characteristics of complex representative democracies further com-
plicate the search for qualitative vote dilution standards. First, a voter's prefer-
ences may vary according to the district in which she is placed.74 Even in the
presence of reliable polling, such fluidity in preferences, particularly when cou-
pled with the possibility of strategic voting,75 obfuscates individual preference
orders.
Second, and perhaps more important, the characteristics of modem repre-
sentative democracies increase the likelihood of intransitive social preference
orders: The morass of conflicting issue and candidate preferences frustrates
attempts to filter out a principled standard of qualitative vote dilution. As one
commentator notes:
As voters we are Democrats and Republicans, blacks and whites, males and
females. But we are also hawks and doves, redistributionists and laissez-faire
advocates. We are atheist, agnostic, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and
Buddhist, all of various stripes. We are trade unionists and managers, Main
Streeters and cosmopoles. Some of us prefer hot, charismatic candidates;
others prefer cooler types. Some of us prefer the well-educated or the well-
bred. Others prefer regular Joes and Joans. The list of our voting-relevant
divisions is virtually endless.76
This multiplicity of personal preferences and social influences makes a natural
occurrence of spectrum agreement unlikely. Voters can and do cross race and
party lines for a variety of reasons. The resulting lack of spectrum agreement
increases the likelihood of intransitive outcomes. Thus, an effective solution to
the problem of qualitative vote dilution requires a standard that accommodates
individuals who align with different candidates for divergent reasons. How-
ever, the dictates of Arrow's theorem throw a serious roadblock in front of any
such effort.
2. Reactions to the problems raised by Arrow's theorem.
Larry Alexander contends that in a modem representative democracy where
voters often cross race and party lines, Arrow's theorem implies that there is no
method to measure vote dilution beyond the quantitative standard of "one per-
son, one vote."77 Either no person can prove qualitative vote dilution or, if one
can, every person can demonstrate dilution by characterizing his or her vote as
74. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 572-73 (illustrating how a voter's preferences may differ
depending whether she is in a district that is ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous).
75. An individual voting strategically votes against her true preferences, intending to bring about a
social choice she desires more than the one that could otherwise be reached if she voted in accordance
with her true preferences. For example, in states with open primaries, a Democrat could vote for her
least preferred candidate in the Republican primary to help ensure the ultimate success of the Demo-
cratic candidate in the general election. For a good theoretical discussion of strategic voting, see
ORDESHOOK, supra note 12, at 82-89. For historical examples, see RKER, supra note 8, at 141-56.
76. Alexander, supra note 1, at 575.
77. Id. at 575-76.
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part of some conceivable group interest.78 Without a neutral procedural
method of identifying qualitative vote dilution, any remedy courts devise will
actually be a substantive political decision.79 In a sense, courts will act as
dictators, usurping legislative authority and setting up agendas and districts to
achieve their preferred social preference orders. Since courts cannot determine
when qualitative vote dilution has occurred, Alexander advocates that they do
"absolutely nothing."80
However, Alexander's declaration of the death of qualitative vote dilution
may be premature. Arrow's theorem does not wholly invalidate attempts to
derive standards for qualitative vote dilution. Rather, the theorem proposes that
no social choice function, and hence no qualitative vote dilution standard, can
satisfy all of Arrow's conditions of fairness and logicality. Thus instead of
completely abandoning the search for a qualitative vote dilution standard,
courts should follow a more pragmatic course and recharacterize the search in
terms of the theorem. More specifically, when devising a qualitative vote dilu-
tion standard, courts should decide which of Arrow's five conditions to
surrender.
III. PRAGMATIC ACCOMMODATIONS WITH ARRow's THEOREM
A. Lessons for Voting Rights Advocates
1. Devise and apply standards in limited circumstances.
Courts and legislatures should devise and apply standards for qualitative
vote dilution only in limited circumstances. More specifically, a standard
should be applied only to a limited number of groups within districts that dis-
play spectrum agreement.
Limiting application of a qualitative vote dilution standard to a few groups
prevents some of the practical problems attendant to Arrow's theorem. Indeed,
to avoid the potential complications the theorem describes, legislatures and
courts should be wary of extending standards to more than one group within a
district at a time. Voting cycles are more often found in districts with a wide
array of individual preference orders and complex voting patterns.81 Individu-
als in complex representative democracies have as many claims for vote dilu-
tion as there are groups of which they are members. Focusing upon any
particular group will inevitably dilute the vote of another; focusing upon all
groups is theoretically impossible. Since a districting plan that benefits one
group most likely dilutes others' voting power,82 attempts to devise a standard
applicable to a large number of groups are destined to fail. Legislatures and
78. Id. at 576. Alexander raises a related issue: "If we cannot determine whom a voting scheme
actually hurts, who should have standing to challenge it?" Id. at 577.
79. Id. at 578-79.
80. Id at 577-78. Alexander would instead leave the choice of how to district to "the imperfect
but more accountable political mechanism, the legislature." Id. at 578.
81. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
82. Alexander, supra note 1, at 576-77.
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courts should therefore limit the number of groups that may make vote dilution
claims in any particular district.
Having limited the number of groups that may claim vote dilution, the
courts' inquiries should shift to the more substantive issue of prioritizing claims
of vote dilution. In keeping with the post-Civil War amendments8 3 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,84 claims by the historically disadvantaged minori-
ties they target should probably receive first priority. Secondary groups' claims
should receive consideration only if a district lacks a significant number of
historically disadvantaged minorities. In any case, prioritization should strictly
limit the number of possible dilution claims. As suggested above, a large
number of groups can quickly overwhelm the search for qualitative vote dilu-
tion standards.
Larry Alexander, the advocate of judicial inaction in the vote dilution
arena,8 5 considers the option of limiting dilution claims to a few historically
disadvantaged groups. However, he concludes that historically disadvantaged
minorities do not form a cohesive voting bloc and that, consequently, a vote
dilution standard for even a small number of groups will be prone to intransitiv-
ities.8 6 This response is telling, since Alexander does not completely reject the
notion of devising a vote dilution standard. Instead, he merely argues that fo-
cusing on one minority group is not a sufficient condition for devising a worka-
ble standard: A meaningful vote dilution standard must apply where targeted
minority groups also form cohesive voting blocs. Alexander's admission di-
rects us to the second limiting principle implied by Arrow's theorem: the need
for spectrum agreement.8 7
Legislatures and courts should primarily focus on the qualitative vote dilu-
tion claims within districts demonstrating some degree of spectrum agreement.
Such agreement decreases the risk of intransitive outcomes, permitting courts
to develop qualitative vote dilution standards that do not violate Arrow's basic
conditions of fairness and logicality.88 Without spectrum agreement, the risk
of intransitivities makes any qualitative vote dilution standard relatively mean-
ingless. In short, although spectrum agreement in a multifaceted, representa-
tive democracy is rare, the risk of intransitive outcomes declines to the extent
that spectrum agreement does exist. Therefore, qualitative vote dilution stan-
dards, and the legal cases built around them, are strongest where there is some
agreement on the spectrum of alternatives.
Reliance upon spectrum agreement to generate a transitive vote dilution
standard, however, sacrifices Arrow's condition of universal admissibility. By
definition, spectrum agreement implies the absence of certain individual prefer-
ence orders, and thus involves a clear violation of universal admissibility. Even
83. U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIII-XV.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1988).
85. See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
86. Alexander, supra note 1, at 579.
87. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
88. See REnR, supra note 8, at 128 ("If... voters have a common view of the political [spectrum]
... then a transitive outcome is guaranteed.").
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a social choice procedure operating on a profile with naturally occurring spec-
trum agreement may violate universal admissibility, since that condition re-
quires that a social choice function generate a complete transitive outcome for
any possible preference profile.
As discussed in Part I, compromising the condition of universal admissibil-
ity jeopardizes a basic element of democratic fairness.89 Natural spectrum
agreement, however, satisfies the fairness concerns embodied by that condition.
In cases of natural spectrum agreement, voters face no prior restraints on their
preference orders. As a result, natural spectrum agreement does not implicate
the principal justification for universal admissibility, the immorality of denying
the ballot to people with certain preference orders. Cases of natural spectrum
agreement instead indicate that voters' individual preferences happen to align
along a common spectrum. Thus, universal admissibility is not sacrificed by
denying anyone the right to vote from the outset, but by determining when
enough spectrum agreement exists to make cycling unlikely. In short, to sacri-
fice universal admissibility in a value-restricted district is to sacrifice very little.
On a practical level, courts should focus their efforts on districts that exhibit
some form of bloc voting. Bloc voting makes spectrum agreement more likely:
Both majority and minority voters may have preferences that align along some
issue spectrum.90 For example, in a racially polarized voting district with white
(w) and black (b) candidates, voters have preferences like bPbPw, bPwPw,
wPwPb, and wPbPb, rather than bPwPb or wPbPw.91 The candidate's race
determines whether he or she appears at the beginning or the end of individual
preference orders. Bloc voting thus offers an example of a natural value
restrictedness that decreases the likelihood of intransitivities without imposing
prior restraints upon individual preferences. In sum, since vote dilution stan-
dards can only avoid the strictures of Arrow's theorem in limited circum-
stances, courts should target their attempts to devise standards on a small
number of groups located within districts exhibiting a great degree of spectrum
agreement.
2. Pay attention to agenda control.
Courts and legislatures must guard against agenda manipulation designed to
control outcomes.92 Intransitive social preference orders permit the agenda set-
ter to act as a dictator.93 As Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer point out,
89. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
90. A more sophisticated analysis of racial bloc voting would examine spectrum agreement re-
garding a candidate's position on issues affecting race as well as his or her actual race.
91. Racial spectrum agreement should not be confused with agreement upon the candidates. With
racial spectrum agreement, although white voters will prefer white candidates, and black voters black
candidates, both groups agree that the candidates are arrayed on the same basic spectrum. In other
words, whites rest on one side, and blacks on the other.
92. See texts accompanying notes 32 & 64 supra. This second lesson of Arrow's theorem carries
broad implications. For example, policymakers should carefully supervise both primary and general
elections. Indeed, Arrow's theorem suggests that the processes leading up to the final election should be
monitored as closely as the final election itself.
93. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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"[tjhe possibility of intransitive social choices means that the order in which
issues are put to a vote determines which alternative will be adopted." 94 For
example, in the case of the cycle xPyPzPx, any alternative can prevail depend-
ing on the particular sequence of binary elections used to determine the winner.
In other words, pitting x against y, with the winner to face z, results in the social
choice z; pitting y against z, with the winner to face x, results in the social
choice x; and pitting x against z, with the winner to face y, results in the social
choice y. Manipulation of the agenda is tantamount to manipulation of the
outcome.
Transitive social preference orders provide the best protection against
agenda manipulation. Yet while securing spectrum agreement is one way to
assure such transitivity, even the most careful attention to the presence of such
agreement may not be enough. Indeed, the difficulty of confirming and main-
taining spectrum agreement may thwart efforts to prevent agenda manipulation.
First, practical difficulties plague the process of measuring spectrum agree-
ment.95 Second, voter preferences may unexpectedly shift and realign under
new issues. Finally, spectrum agreement based on minority status may dissi-
pate with advances in social justice. These difficulties are all exacerbated in
important elections, since the incentive to manipulate becomes greater when
more is at stake. Such prospects make intransitive results possible and even
likely, which in turn opens the door to agenda manipulation.
B. Legislative and Judicial Incorporation of the Lessons of Arrow's
Theorem
The principal legislative and judicial formulations of vote dilution standards
appear to incorporate the main lessons of Arrow's theorem. Plaintiffs have two
avenues to pursue vote dilution claims. First, plaintiffs may claim that a dilut-
ing electoral device violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.96 Second, plaintiffs may seek the remedy provided by sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.97 Rather than survey the entire array of vote
dilution remedies, the following Part will focus on section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, as amended in 1982, and its subsequent interpretation by the
Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles.98
94. FROHLICH & OPPENHEmmR, supra note 6, at 27.
95. "[R]acially polarized voting is not self-evident. Because individual voting records are secret,
one cannot immediately determine whether minorities and whites vote for the same or different candi-
dates." GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 82; see id. at 82-108 (detailing many of the problems and
methodologies associated with measuring racial bloc voting).
96. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that vote dilution violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (1988). These sections establish a cause of action for those pro-
tected classes whose voting rights are abridged by improper electoral maneuvering. Section 5 also
provides for prior approval by the Attorney General of legislative apportionment schemes for jurisdic-
tions with a history of electoral discrimination. l § 1973c.
98. 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986); see note 68 supra.
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1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act make vote dilution an ac-
tionable offense. On its face, section 2 of the Act99 seems to incorporate the
lessons of Arrow's theorem. For example, it only permits dilution claims based
on race or color. In most districts, this requirement significantly limits the
number of groups that may make qualitative vote dilution claims. By legitimiz-
ing the use of minority representation levels as an index of vote dilution, sec-
tion 2 also underscores the importance of spectrum agreement in developing
effective vote dilution claims.1° ° Furthermore, by considering "the political
processes leading to nomination or election,"'' section 2 acknowledges the
power of agenda control. In short, the text of the Voting Rights Act, and of
section 2 in particular, generally accords with the dictates of Arrow's theorem.
The extensive legislative history of the 1982 amendments also comports
with the lessons of Arrow's theorem. The report by the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary declared that proof of a section 2 violation may include several
specified indicia of dilution, collectively known as the "Senate factors."'12
99. Section 2 reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on, account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
100. Since complete agreement on a race spectrum usually results in the disproportionate election
of majority candidates under most district voting procedures, the statute allows courts to consider rela-
tive levels of representation as evidence of vote dilution. Id. § 1973(b); see note 72 supra.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
102. The complete text of the Senate factors appears in Vo-nNo RIGmS ACT EXTENSION: REPORT
OF Tim CoMMIrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON S. 1992 wmi ADDITIONAL, MINOR-
try, AmD SuPPLEmAL Vmws, S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982). Those factors
include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision
that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is ra-
cially polarized;
3. the extent to which the.., subdivision has used [any of various] voting practices or
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the ... subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in [other areas] which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
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Significantly, several of these factors closely parallel the requirements of Ar-
row's theorem.
Senate factors two, six, and seven help ensure the presence of spectrum
agreement. Factor two, "the extent to which voting in the elections ... is
racially polarized,"10 3 provides a fairly direct measure of spectrum agreement.
Senate factor six considers "whether political campaigns have been character-
ized by overt or subtle racial appeals." 104 In a campaign marred by racial ap-
peals, candidates may either believe that a significant amount of racial
spectrum agreement exists or that such agreement can be fostered. Factor
seven, "the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction," 10 5 relates to racial bloc voting since, under
most district voting procedures, complete agreement on a racial spectrum will
result in the election of majority candidates in disproportionate numbers.
Senate factors three and four concentrate on agenda control. Factor three
reviews the extent to which a jurisdiction exhibits discrimination-enhancing
electoral procedures. 1°6 Senate factor four examines "whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to [the candidate slating] pro-
cess." 107 By focusing on attempts to control the agenda, either during the slat-
ing process or the election itself, factors three and four direct attention to a
particularly dangerous aspect of social choice procedures. Through addressing
spectrum agreement and agenda manipulation, the language and legislative his-
tory of section 2 reflect some of the basic lessons derived from Arrow's
theorem.
2. Thornburg v. Gingles.
In its first major interpretation of the 1982 amendment to section 2, the
Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles'0 8 focused significant attention on ra-
cial bloc voting in analyzing qualitative vote dilution. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority in Thornburg, devised a three-pronged test to identify vote
dilution in multimember districts:
These circumstances are necessary preconditions for a [violation of section 2].
First, the minority group must be... sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.... Second, the
minority group must be... politically cohesive.... Third, the minority must
be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 10 9
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id. Factor three lists "unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, [and]
anti-single shot provisions" as examples of "voting practices or procedures that may enhance the oppor-
tunity for discrimination against the minority group." Id.
107. Id.
108. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see note 68 supra.
109. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
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Taken together, Justice Brennan's conditions address several of the major con-
cerns raised by Arrow's theorem.
The first condition's emphasis on size and compactness basically requires a
minority interest worthy of protection. This condition effectively limits the
number of groups with a legally cognizable claim of vote dilution. Together,
the second and third conditions, which measure minority and majority bloc
voting, make racially polarized voting a precondition for vote dilution claims.
In other words, in Thornburg the Supreme Court made spectrum agreement a
necessary condition for proving qualitative vote dilution.
Justice Brennan, however, failed to clearly articulate the underlying reason
for making racially polarized voting a precondition to dilution claims.
Grofman suggests that Justice Brennan may have merely reiterated the ratio-
nales expressed by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in previous vote dilution
cases: 110 "Unless there is an initial showing of significant racial bloc voting,
the other factors will not demonstrate that the plaintiffs have suffered a substan-
tial inability to elect their preferred candidates.""' This statement, however,
begs the question why courts should demand a showing of racial bloc voting in
vote dilution claims.
Arrow's theorem provides one possible answer to the question Justice Bren-
nan left open. Namely, showing qualitative vote dilution requires comparing
an actual outcome against a standard, an ideal outcome. Identifying the stan-
dard depends upon confirming the existence of transitive social preference or-
ders. Yet Arrow's theorem shows that attempts to derive a standard will violate
at least one fairness condition. The presence of a natural spectrum agreement,
however, guarantees the existence of a transitive social preference order and
thus helps identify the ideal outcome without sacrificing the underlying fairness
concerns of universal admissibility. 12 Since racial bloc voting is a form of
natural spectrum agreement, the presence of racially polarized voting may justi-
fiably be deemed a critical precondition to qualitative vote dilution claims.
CONCLUSION
Justice Frankfurter did not overstate his warning to courts regarding the
dangers inherent in the "political thicket" of legislative apportionment. Indeed,
recent judicial forays into that thicket have increasingly become entangled in an
imposing theoretical dilemma. The dilemma Arrow's theorem describes may
be a fundamental cause of the Supreme Court's inability to devise an "ideal"
110. GROFMAN ur AL., supra note 65, at 50. The 5th Circuit previously emphasized the impor-
tance of racial polarization in vote dilution cases. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364,
379-80 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming that the test for vote dilution relies on election results). The 11th
Circuit in United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984), emphasized the significance of racial polarization to a § 2 vote dilution
standard: "[T]his factor will ordinarily be the keystone of a dilution case." Id. at 1566; cf. United States
v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1439-40 (1lth Cir. 1988) (factoring the history of racially
polarized voting in Dallas County into the court's analysis of a proposed remedial voting plan), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
111. GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 65, at 50.
112. See notes 23-25 & 60-64 supra and accompanying texts.
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outcome against which to measure vote dilution. An ideal standard should sat-
isfy some basic conditions of fairness and logicality-nondictatorship, Pareto
efficiency, universal admissibility, independence from irrelevant alternatives,
and transitivity. Arrow's theorem, however, dictates that no standard can sat-
isfy all of those conditions. Rather, the only way to guarantee meaningful,
transitive outcomes is to sacrifice at least one fairness condition.
Although Arrow's theorem appears to conceptually preclude the existence
of fair and logical vote dilution standards, recharacterizing the search in terms
of the theorem may provide a solution. Courts should focus on those circum-
stances in which the sacrifice of one of Arrow's conditions is the least distaste-
ful. Spectrum agreement guarantees a transitive outcome but sacrifices
universal admissibility. Natural spectrum agreement in the form of racial bloc
voting, however, enables courts to devise meaningful vote dilution standards
without imposing prior restraints on individuals' preferences. This approach
sacrifices universal admissibility without unduly burdening democratic
fairness.
By mapping the landscape of the problem of qualitative vote dilution, Ar-
row's theorem can guide decisionmakers in devising new standards. Recent
decisions by courts and legislatures generally comport with the principles and
dictates of the theorem. Arrow's theorem, then, may help the Supreme Court
light a path out of a difficult political thicket.
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